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UNAMIR
1994 MAY 25 15 57

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FROM: RIZA, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 25 MAY 1994

NO. OF PAGES: 3

MIR-1034

SUBJECT: Rwanda

1. Attached self-explanatory note for urgent delivery to Secretary-General.
2. Full report will be presented on return to HQ over weekend.

Many thanks.

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
NOTE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

RWANDA

1. After meetings with both parties, it is apparent that the gap between them on a political settlement is so wide and so deep that it will take prolonged negotiations to reach a settlement. Even the format of negotiations will be problematic as RPF refuses any contact with the "interim government" which it regards as illegal and as accomplices in the scheme to decimate RPF and its supporters in a coup planned to start with the assassination of the late President. Even the Arusha Agreement, including its essential elements of power sharing and elections are being questioned by the "interim government", the extent of whose authority is uncertain.
2. With this prospect, a cease-fire becomes even more urgent in order to stop the loss of life both in military operations as well as through wanton killings. A cease-fire also is essential for an effective humanitarian assistance programme, although some NGOs already have started operations in the RPF controlled zone, which covers about half the country.
3. Since the RPF is on the offensive and has gained some significant military successes, especially in occupying Kigali Airport, it is being rigid in imposing conditions on the demoralized government forces, with whom it is ready to have contacts. We are proposing to both sides that the outline cease-fire agreement that they signed after their talks with OAU in April serve as a base for a more detailed agreement, which we are drafting, to include such points as the control of militias, assumption of responsibility for safety of civilians in their respective zones, ending inflammatory radio broadcasts, accepting Kigali Airport as a neutral zone etc.
4. In your meeting with the RPF Vice-President, you might emphasize the urgency of a cease-fire agreement aimed at reducing the misery and suffering that the Rwandan population is undergoing. This will require some flexibility from RPF on the terms of the agreement which UNAMIR is proposing. This does not imply any commitments by RPF to any subsequent political formula, nor any negotiations with the "interim government" to whom RPF's position has been made clear. The RPF Vice-President might ask you to clarify

the situation regarding Dr. Booh Booh (they had made this one of their conditions for a cease-fire) and you might respond in appropriate terms.

5. For your background information, the "interim prime minister" this afternoon said that the Arusha Agreement had been based on "false assumptions" that a political agreement could resolve the problem of Rwanda which was fundamentally ethnic. RPF had tried a ruse by using opposition political parties to join it in grabbing, through the Arusha Agreements, far more power than its demographic proportion of 15% justified. In doing so, it had raised fears and resentments in the majority population which had reached the point of explosion even if the President had not been killed. Elections could not solve this fundamental problem of Rwanda, nor could the military domination being attempted by RPF since eventually this would be reversed by the majority population. A political formula would have to be devised and this could be done in the framework of the Arusha agreements although it is essential elements had been invalidated by the convulsion still enveloping Rwanda.



S. Aqbal Riza

Kigali, 25 May 1994

UNAMIR
1994 MAY 24

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ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



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MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

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P 1/2

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TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK (ONLY)

INFO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK (ONLY)

FROM: RIZA, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 24 MAY 1994

NO. OF PAGES: 2

SUBJECT: Rwanda MIR-1028

1. Baril and I had rough meeting with RPF in Mulindi yesterday. Kanyarwenge (Chairman), and his political and military advisers bitterly criticised UN on several points (details later). Kagame evidently was in Kigali area overseeing operations.

2. RPF rejects any dealings with "interim government" in Gitarama, holding them accomplices in planned genocidal killings. They insisted that we have no contacts with "illegal and criminal" group. I said that Arusha Agreement and Security Council resolutions involved both parties and I considered it essential to ascertain other sides intentions vis-a-vis resolution 918 mandate. RPF prefers that we deal only with RGF military leaders in Kigali, which we had planned to do. RPF appeared to acquiesce reluctantly to our visit to Gitarama, and agreed to another meeting with us in Mulindi if required.

3. Positive points are:

- Although on military offensive and prepared to deal with RGF only on military level, RPF accepts that only political solution can ensure stability.
- RPF accepts validity of Arusha framework, subject to "adjustments" to changed political situation.
- RPF agrees in principle to cooperate with resolution 918 mandate subject to certain operational conditions and their control of airport guaranteeing its "neutrality", if RGF cooperates for humanitarian assistance flights (not very likely).
- Of course we insisted, but to no avail, that only UN control could establish neutral zone of airport.

4. Yesterday we could not go by road from Mulindi to Kigali. RPF presenting one argument on another on security grounds, and RGF waffling on guaranteeing security at interahamwe roadblocks. Our impression is that RPF aim was to have us land at Kigali airport to demonstrate their control. Today we plan to meet RGF commanders in Kigali and tomorrow "interim government" in Gitarama.

5. Would appreciate your arranging to obtain from OLA/DPA by Friday (for drafting of report over weekend) clarifications on two points of political-legal nature raised by RPF:

- Status of "interim government" in terms of Rwandan constitution and Arusha Agreement (Article 3, especially sub para.2). Is it a successor government (de jure? de facto?) Or a de facto authority (with little current authority over military or militia)?
- "Legality" of resolution 918, in drafting of which one of the parties - Rwandese Foreign Minister - was involved and other party was not consulted (presumably DPA/OLA drew President's attention to Charter Article 27(3), although presumably it applies primarily to States).

6. Will keep you informed.

Best regards.

P.S. Above written en route Entebbe-Kigali. In Kigali Dallaire has arranged both effective truce (until now) and fine programme of meetings.