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PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

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Rwanda

Mr. Riza gave an extensive briefing to members on the recent political and military ^{si-tua} situation in Rwanda and answered questions. The Belgian force expected to complete its evacuation tomorrow, there was no effective cease-fire, the RPF had brought troops into the city from the north and south and some units of the government forces were putting up resistance. There was no significant political contact between the two sides, although UNAMIR was trying to transmit messages between the two sides. Instability had been exacerbated by the news of the Belgian decision to withdraw from UNAMIR and rumours that the rest of UNAMIR would depart; this had led to hostility from people who felt they were being abandoned. The Force Commander felt that if the Belgian contingent of UNAMIR left, then the security of the rest of the force could not be guaranteed, nor could the airport remain secure.

UNAMIR was not capable of performing the tasks under its present mandate. However, it was trying to ensure the safety of UN personnel, evacuating people and escort convoys to Burundi and the airport, carrying out some humanitarian functions, protecting civilians where possible, undertaking specific missions to take people to safety, trying to bring about a cease-fire and truce, and facilitating communications between the two sides. Mr. Riza commended the remarkable performance of the Force Commander in such difficult circumstances (a commendation that was reiterated by France).

ONUMUR was carrying out its patrolling duties and had not reported the introduction of arms supplies across the border. It was directly linked to UNAMIR, and if the latter force was withdrawn, there would be little reason for ONUMUR to remain.

After delegations had spoken, Mr. Riza raised the question of protecting civilian nationals in the long term, and referred to the critical situation at the stadium and hospital. The protection of civilians would require more resources, and the

Council should consider whether PKOs should be assigned such tasks.

Mr. Riza ^{Later} also reported on a cable just received that the RPF and the Rwandan armed forces had agreed to a meeting tomorrow at the request of the latter with the Special Representative and the Force Commander.

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Almost all delegations spoke on the question of UNAMIR's future. Generally speaking, the consensus was that neither of the two "extreme" options were acceptable (referring to a "Somalia-type" peace-enforcement operation and total withdrawal). Delegations were also insistent that the Secretariat should come up by tomorrow with a number of feasible options that came between the two unacceptable options.

Nigeria, on behalf of the NAM Caucus, presented a draft resolution (text attached), encouraging a cease-fire and deciding to increase the strength of UNAMIR and revise its mandate. Nigeria stressed that the concern of the Council should not be limited to the fate of UN personnel and foreigners but should also include the innocent civilians of Rwanda.

Arguments presented against a complete withdrawal of the force, presented by Nigeria, France and others, included: that only the Belgians had so far expressed this intention; that it would be a bad signal to send to the Rwandan parties and people; that the UN's credibility would suffer (in fact, said Djibouti, it had already suffered when the Prime Minister and others were seized from UN property); that the carnage would spread to the rest of the country and also to Burundi.

France, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain referred to the Secretary-General's letter of today, and disagreed, with varying degrees of indignation, with the apparent implication that the withdrawal of the Belgian contingent was a cause of further instability and a reason for UNAMIR's ceasing to exist in future. The UK said the letter was not an adequate reply to the questions posed by the Council, nor an adequate

basis for moving forward. It was a "great pity" that the letter seemed to blame the Belgians rather than the Rwandans, and particularly unfortunate when the accusation was levelled at a contingent that had just lost ten of its nationals. "Even more bizarre" was the implication that everything would be fine if the Belgians remained, when this was palpably not the case.

In response, Mr. de Soto said it had certainly not been the intention of the Secretary-General to blame the Belgians; in fact, his remarks in some way represented a compliment to them by stressing their indispensability. The problem for the immediate future lay in "the tenability of UNAMIR's capacity to discharge its present mandate".

France stressed the need to exert pressure on the RPF, in Kigali, New York and (implicitly) through Uganda. The RPF should be informed of the importance attached by the Council to the UN's continued presence in Kigali. The intervention of the OAU and neighbouring countries could be very important. The UK agreed that the OAU should reinforce the UN's political role, but felt Tanzania and Uganda should be invited "more positively" to help these efforts.

The US was troubled by the difficulty of maintaining UNAMIR at its present level in such circumstances, and suggested leaving a "small skeletal" operation to show the will of the international community. Later, the Council might see what could be done about giving an effective mandate. Russia also approvingly spoke of what it called the "Angolan option", although Djibouti was certainly not in favour of this. New Zealand felt there would need to be a serious security detail left behind if the Special Representative was asked to remain.

Brazil said UNAMIR should be given a "very short and precise" mandate, including the protection of civilians and the promotion of a cease-fire and political dialogue. The UK declared there was no evidence, either now or in the foreseeable future, that UNAMIR would be in a position to protect civilians; the Council should not lend itself to a "tragic fiction" whereby it merely declared that something would be done. New Zealand also had reservations about the feasibility of protecting

civilians, given the possibility of revenge attacks by the minority ethnic group. Much depended on how the RPF would behave after its imminent take-over of Kigali.

A number of delegations, including France and China, expressed their satisfaction with the efforts of UNAMIR so far.

Most delegations reiterated that there was an urgent need for a report (oral if necessary) from the Secretariat tomorrow, with concrete recommendations on where UNAMIR could be deployed and what would be the scope of the operation. Mr. Riza assured members that the Secretariat would do its best, while pointing out the problems of communicating both with the UN representatives in the field and with the Secretary-General in Madrid.

Somalia Commission of Enquiry

It was agreed that if no member had any comment to make to the President on the report of the Commission of Enquiry by tomorrow, there would be no discussion of the subject.

Libya and Chad

A draft technical resolution was introduced by the President (text attached), and the UK hoped it would be voted on tomorrow. Russia and China were very doubtful about the reference to Chapter VII, but the UK and the US insisted that it was legally necessary. The Chinese suggestion to use its usual favourite phrase about relevant resolutions would not work since there were no relevant resolutions in this case.

PROGRAMME OF WORK

Thursday, 14 April 1994

4.30 pm Informal consultations on Rwanda and other matters.